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COMMENT
BIBBS V. BLOCK. STANDARD OF CAUSATION AND
BURDEN OF PROOF IN AN INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE
TREATMENT ACTION UNDER TITLE VII
Disparate treatment of an individual in an employment decision because
of the individual's race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, is the most
obvious discriminatory practice Congress sought to prohibit under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).2 The burden of proof in disparate
1. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (discussion
of disparate treatment and disparate impact actions pursuant to Title VII). In Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, the United States Supreme Court stated that an individual alleging
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
may bring an action under the disparate treatment or disparate impact theory or both. Id. The
disparate treatment of an individual in an employment decision because of the individual's race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex is the most easily understood type of employment
discrimination. Id. Disparate impact actions challenge facially neutral employment practices
that discriminate against protected groups without business necessity. Id. The primary distinction
between disparate treatment and disparate impact actions is that a plaintiff alleging disparate
treatment must prove that a discriminatory intent motivated the employment decision. Id.
Bigoted or otherwise discriminatory statements made by an employer's representatives may
establish that a discriminatory intent motivated an employment decision. See B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIscEMINATIO LAW 15 n.7 (1983) (discussion of burden of proof in
disparate treatment actions) [hereinafter cited as SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].
Direct evidence of discriminatory motivation, however, is difficult to produce and relatively
unusual. Id. at 15; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)
(discussion of prima facie case concept for disparate treatment action). Recognizing that direct
evidence of discriminatory intent often is unavailable, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green established a prima facie case concept for individual disparate treatment actions
under Title VII. See 411 U.S. at 802-04. To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment
the plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff applied for an available position, that the plaintiff
possessed the required qualifications, and that the employer rejected the plaintiff under
circumstances which create an inference of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 802. To avoid
liability, the employer must articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment
decision. Id. The plaintiff then must prove that the employer's proffered reasons are a mere
pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. at 804.
2. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1982). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
provides that it shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual in
employment because of the individual's race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). Before an individual may file a disparate treatment or disparate impact
action under Title VII, the individual must file a charge of employment discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days after the alleged discrim-
inatory employment practice. Id. §2000e-5(e). If the EEOC determines that a charge of
discriminatory employment practice has merit, the EEOC must endeavor to eliminate the alleged
unlawful employment practice by the informal methods of mediation and conciliation. Id.
§2000e-5(b). If the EEOC is unable to negotiate a conciliation agreement within 30 days after
an aggrieved party files a charge, the EEOC may file suit against the employer charged with
using discriminatory employment practices. Id. §2000e-5(O. If the EEOC dismisses the charge
or for any reason fails to negotiate a settlement or file suit within 180 days after the charge is
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treatment actions under Title VII remains at all times with the plaintiff.3 The
plaintiff must establish that the employer's discriminatory intent motivated
the employment decision. 4 The appropriate standard of causation in disparate
treatment actions under Title VII is more problematic, however, because
employment decisions may include both discriminatory and nondiscrimina-
tory considerations. 5
filed, the EEOC must issue a right to sue notice to the charging party. Id. Within 90 days after
receiving the EEOC's right to sue notice, the charging party may file suit against the charged
employer. Id.
3. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251 (1981)
(discussion of burden of proof in disparate treatment actions). In Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine the plaintiff, Joyce Ann Burdine, alleged that sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII motivated the Texas Department of Community Affairs' decision to deny the
plaintiff's promotion. Id. The plaintiff appealed the district court's holding that nondiscrimi-
natory considerations motivated the promotion decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that
after a plaintiff in a disparate treatment action establishes a prima facie case of employment
discrimination the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons motivated the employment decision. Id. at 252. The Supreme Court
in Burdine vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision, and held that in a disparate treatment action
the ultimate burden of proving that an employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff. Id. at 253. The Burdine Court stated that after a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of employment discrimination the burden of production, not
persuasion, shifts to the employer. Id. at 254-55. The Supreme Court stated that to meet the
burden of production the employer must introduce admissible evidence of legitimate nondiscri-
minatory reasons for the employment decision. Id. at 255. See generally Note, Easing Title V11
Burdens From the Employer, 5 AM. J. OF TRIAL ADVOC. 337 (1981) (discussion of Burdine and
burden of proof in disparate treatment actions); Comment, Civil Rights: Defendant's Burden
of Proof in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 143 (1981) (discussion of
employer's burden of proof in disparate treatment actions after Burdine).
4. See 450 U.S. at 253. In Burdine, the Supreme Court stated that in a disparate
treatment action the plaintiff must prove that the employer intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff. Id.
5. See Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A
Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 293 (1982) (discussion of degree of causation
required in mixed-motive disparate treatment actions) [hereinafter cited as Brodin, Standard of
Causation]. If both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory considerations influence an employ-
ment decision, the question arises as to how large a part the discriminatory factor must play in
the decision to establish a violation of Title VII. Id. Several federal courts of appeals have
articulated various formulations for the appropriate standard of causation in disparate treatment
actions. See, e.g., Carino v. Univ. of Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 820 (10th Cir.
1984) (discriminatory consideration must be significant factor in employment decision); Jackson
v. RKO Bottlers of Toledo, Inc., 743 F.2d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff establishes Title
VII violation if plaintiff proves that discriminatory consideration more likely than not motivated
employment decision); Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1984) (plaintiff establishes Title VII violation if plaintiff proves that discriminatory
consideration is significant factor in employment decision); Lewis v. Univ. Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d
910, 914 (3d Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must prove that but for consideration of discriminatory factor
employment decision would have been favorable to plaintiff to establish Title VII violation);
McMillan v. Rust College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983) (standard of causation
requires showing that but for consideration of discriminatory factor employment decision would
not have been adverse to plaintiff); Cuthbertson v. Bigger Bros., Inc., 702 F.2d 454, 458 (4th
1440 [Vol. 42:1439
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In a mixed-motive disparate treatment action, the degree of causal
relation required between the unlawful motive and the employment decision
will profoundly influence the outcome of a disparate treatment case. 6 Several
federal courts of appeals have indicated that an employer in a mixed-motive
disparate treatment action may avoid the imposition of some forms of relief
or even escape liability altogether if the employer can establish that he would
have reached the same decision absent the proven discriminatory considera-
tion.7 In Bibbs v. Block, 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit considered the proper allocation of the burden of proof and the
appropriate standard of causation in a mixed-motive disparate treatment
action under Title VII. 9
In Bibbs, the plaintiff, Thomas Bibbs, filed a civil action against the
United States Department of Agriculture (DOA) in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri.'0 The plaintiff, who is black,
alleged that a DOA selection committee had denied the plaintiff's promotion
application on the basis of discriminatory racial considerations in violation
of Title VII." The DOA employed the plaintiff as an offset press operator
Cir. 1983) (discriminatory consideration must have more likely motivated employment decision
than reasons employer proffered).
6. See Brodin, Standards of Causation, supra note 5, at 294. Professor Brodin empha-
sized that the allocations of burdens of causation and standards of proof will determine the
outcome of disparate treatment actions and influence Title VII actions filed in the future. Id.
7. See Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875-76 (l1th Cir. 1985) (employer can
rebut plaintiff's evidence of discrimination by proving by preponderance of evidence that
employer would have made same decision absent discriminatory motive); Smith v. State of
Georgia, 749 F.2d 683, 687 (11th Cir. 1985) (employer may rebut direct evidence of discrimi-
natory intent by proving that employer would have made same decision even absent discrimi-
natory consideration); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 751 F.2d 1552, 1557 (1 1th Cir. 1983)
(same).
Other federal courts of appeals have applied the "same decision" test only at the relief
stage in a disparate treatment action under Title VII. See, e.g., Fadhl v. City and County of
San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 1984) (employer must prove that even absent
discriminatory motive employer would not have hired plaintiff to avoid award of back pay to
plaintiff); King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff is
not entitled to award of back pay and offer to hire if employer proves by clear and convincing
evidence that employer would not have hired plaintiff in absence of discrimination); Patterson
v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1984) (award of back pay and
retroactive promotion is not appropriate if employer proves that employer would not have hired
plaintiff in absence of discrimination).
8. 749 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1984).
9. Id. at 510.
10. See Bibbs v. Block, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 33,779, at 30,744-45 (W.D. Mo.
June 14, 1983). In Bibbs, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, a division of
the United States Department of Agriculture (DOA), employed the plaintiff as an offset press
operator. Id.
11. 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 30,745. The plaintiff in Bibbs, 43 years old at the time
of the events in issue, alleged that age discrimination influenced the DOA selection committee's
denial of the plaintiff's promotion application. Id. The district court, however, dismissed the
plaintiff's age discrimination claim. Id. at 30,748. The district court stated that the ages of the
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in the Print Shop of the Kansas City Data Systems Field Office.,2 In 1976,
the plaintiff and six other individuals, all of whom are white, applied for
the position of Offset Press Operator Supervisor.' 3 The Supervisor of Ad-
ministrative Specialists reviewed the applications and forwarded all seven
applications to a selection committee.
1 4
The members of the selection committee consisted of the Head of
Administrative Services, the Office Services Manager, and the Offset Press
Operator Foreman.'5 The selection committee interviewed each of the seven
applicants for the position.1 6 Without discussion of the relative merits of
each applicant or established criteria for selection, each committee member
chose the same top three candidates in the same order.' 7 The close involve-
ment of the Office Services Manager with the operations and employees of
the Print Shop made the Officer Services Manager the central figure in the
promotion selection. '8
The district court emphasized the influential position of the Office
Services Manager in the promotion selection because the plaintiff introduced
evidence that the Office Services Manager had characterized the plaintiff as
a "black militant," and another Print Shop employee, who is black, as
"boy" and "nigger."' 9 The district court stated that the members of the
selectiori committee provided extremely guarded testimony at trial regarding
selection committee's second and third choices, 45 and 39 years old respectively, failed to
support the plaintiff's claim of age discrimination. Id.
12. Id. at 30,745.
13. Id.
14. Id. In Bibbs, Everett Asberry, the Supervisor of Administrative Specialists, reviewed
the applications and assigned ratings to each applicant. Id. After the initial ratings, Asberry
excluded the plaintiff from the list of potential candidates because of a low rating. Id. at 30,748
n.2. Asberry subsequently included the plaintiff in the list of potential candidates, however,
after considering an award the plaintiff had earned in the military. Id.
15. Id. at 30,745.
16. Id.
17. Id. In Bibbs, the selection committee chose Dennis Laube, who is white, for the
position of Offset Press Operator Supervisor. Id.; see Bibbs v. Block, 749 F.2d 508, 509 (8th
Cir. 1983) (discussion of factual basis of each member's decision). Cox stated that Tresnak's
evaluation of each applicant's reputation influenced Cox's considerations. 749 F.2d at 509-10.
Blitgen testified that each applicant's technical knowledge and experience determined Blitgen's
decision. Id. at 510. Tresnak stated that several factors, including previous disciplinary problems,
knowledge of supervision, and knowledge of the commodity operations influenced Tresnak's
decision. Id.
18. Id. at 509. The district court in Bibbs stated that John Blitgen, the Offset Press
Operator Foreman, had worked in the Print Shop less than one month at the time of the
selection. Id. The district court noted that Maynard Cox, Head of Administrative Services,
presided at the selection committee meeting, but stated that the familiarity of Joseph Tresnak,
the Office Services Manager, with the employees and operations of the Print Shop made Tresnak
the key figure in the selection process. Id.
19. 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 30,746. The district court in Bibbs stated that Tresnak
referred to the plaintiff as a "black militant" when Tresnak described the racial mix of the
Print Shop employees. Id. The district court also noted that Tresnak referred to another black
1442 [Vol. 42:1439
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the subjective criteria used in making the promotion decision. 20 The district
court further noted that subjective selection criteria may provide a convenient
screen for discriminatory employment practices. 2' Although the district court
concluded that the Office Services Manager's use of racial slurs tainted the
selection process, the district court did not impose liability on the defendant. 22
The district court stated that the selection committee would have reached
the same decision even if the committee had disregarded the plaintiff's race
because the plaintiff's previous disciplinary problems motivated and deter-
mined the employment decision. 23 The district court reasoned that in a mixed-
motive employment decision, the defendant is not liable unless the plaintiff
proves that the improper motive determined or motivated the decision. 24 The
employee, Trotter, as "boy." Id. In Trotter's presence, Tresnak also stated that there were "no
niggers in Nebraska where I come from." Id. The district court stated that Tresnak seemed
unaware of the plaintiff's sensitivity to such racial slurs. Id.
20. Id. In Bibbs, the district court stated that the defensive and guarded testimony of
each committee member made the district court skeptical that the committee revealed the true
considerations involved in the committee's deliberations. Id.
21. Id. The district court recognized that subjective selection criteria may screen discrim-
inatory employment decisions. Id. The district court, however, did not find the selection
committee's procedures inherently biased against minority applicants. Id.
22. Id. at 30,747. Although the district court in Bibbs concluded that discriminatory racial
considerations influenced the selection process, the court held that the plaintiff did not establish
that discriminatory racial considerations prevented the plaintiff's promotion. Id. The district
court entered judgment for the defendant, stating that to establish liability under Title VII the
plaintiff must prove that discriminatory racial considerations determined the promotion decision.
Id.
23. Id. at 30,746-47. The district court in Bibbs stated that the plaintiff's interpersonal
and disciplinary problems prevented the plaintiff's promotion. Id. The district court noted that
Tresnak met with the plaintiff on several occasions to discuss the plaintiff's unwillingness to
accept direction from the Print Shop Supervisor. Id. The district court stated that the nonselec-
tion of another applicant, who is white, with similar disciplinary problems supported the court's
conclusion that the plaintiff's disciplinary problems prevented the plaintiff's promotion. Id. at
30,748 n.3. The district court also noted that the racial integration of the Print Shop indicated
that discriminatory racial considerations did not motivate the promotion selection. Id. at 30,746.
24. Id. at 30,747. In Bibbs, the district court noted that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has applied two different approaches to determine liability in a
mixed-motive employment decision. Id. One line of cases imposes liability if the improper
motive determined the employment decision. Id.; see, e.g., Tribble v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 669 F.2d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 1982) (liability attaches if improper motive determined
employment decision), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983); Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 594
F.2d 638, 641 (8th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff must show improper motive was determining factor in
employment decision); Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 574 F.2d 958, 960 (8th
Cir. 1978) (liability attaches if determining factor in employment decision was improper motive).
The second line of cases imposes liability on the employer if the improper motive merely entered
into the employment decision. 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 30,747; see, e.g., Satz v. ITT Financial
Corp., 619 F.2d 738, 746 (8th Cir. 1980) (liability attaches if improper motive was factor in
employment decision); Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1289 (8th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff must
show that motivating factor in employment decision was improper motive); Clark v. Mann, 562
F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff need not show that improper motive was sole basis
for employment decision but only that improper motive was motivating factor). The district
19851 1443
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district court, however, invited correction from the Court of Appeals 25 if in
a mixed-motive employment decision, the proper allocation of the burden of
proof and the appropriate standard of causation require only a showing that
an improper motive played a part in the decision rather than formed the
controlling basis for the decision.
26
In reviewing the Bibbs case, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that discriminatory racial considerations influenced the pro-
motion decision. 27 The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected the district court's
standard of causation which required the plaintiff to prove not only that
discriminatory racial considerations influenced the promotion decision, but
also to assume the additional burden of proving that the defendant would
not have made the same decision if the defendant had disregarded the
plaintiff's race. 28 The Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff must prove only
that a discriminatory consideration more likely than not influenced the
employment decision to establish liability in a disparate treatment action
under Title VII.29
court in Bibbs applied the "determining factor" test and invited correction from the Eighth
Circuit. 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 30,147.
25. 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 30,747.
26. Id. at 30,748 n.5. The district court in Bibbs noted that a recent argument proposed
granting partial relief if the plaintiff shows that an improper motive influenced the employment
decision, but that the same decision would have been reached had the improper motive been
disregarded. Id. The district court refrained from initiating the partial remedy proposal, however,
but invited correction from the Eighth Circuit. Id.
27. See Bibbs v. Block, 749 F.2d 508, 512 (8th Cir. 1984). In Bibbs, the Eighth Circuit
stated that the record supported a finding that the racial bias of Joseph Tresnak, the most
influential member of the selection committee, tainted the promotion decision. Id.
28. Id. In Bibbs, the Eighth Circuit stated that the United States Supreme Court has
never adopted the district court's "same decision" rule of causation to determine liability in
Title VII actions. Id.; see Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977)
("same decision" rule of causation applied to employment decisions involving constitutionally
protected rights). In Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, the plaintiff, an untenured teacher,
alleged that the plaintiff's constitutionally protected first and fourteenth amendment freedoms
influenced the defendant's decision to refuse to rehire the plaintiff. 429 U.S. at 276. The
Supreme Court, however, stated that to establish a constitutional violation justifying remedial
action, the plaintiff may not prove merely that the plaintiff's constitutionally protected conduct
influenced the defendant's employment decision. Id. at 285. The Mt. Healthy Court held that
a defendant may avoid liability if the defendant proves that the defendant would have made
the same decision without consideration of the plaintiff's constitutionally protected conduct.
Id. The Supreme Court stated that the "same decision" rule of causation sufficiently vindicates
constitutionally protected conduct because a plaintiff is placed in no worse a position than if
the plaintiff had not engaged in the protected conduct. Id. at 285-86.
The Eighth Circuit in Bibbs also stated that the district court's "same decision" rule of
causation unreasonably required the plaintiff to dispose of the defendant's allegations of the
defendant's subjective intent. Bibbs, 749 F.2d at 513. The Eighth Circuit stated that the district
court required the plaintiff, not the defendant employer, to prove that the employer would not
have made the same decision if the employer had disregarded the plaintiff's race. Id. at 512.
The Bibbs court stated that the "same decision" rule of causation, whether imposed upon the
plaintiff or the defendant employer, is inappropriate in the Title VII analysis. Id. at 513.
29. 749 F.2d at 511; see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
[Vol. 42:14391444
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The Bibbs court stated that after a plaintiff proves that a discriminatory
consideration influenced the employment decision, it is irrelevant and incon-
sistent to determine whether the employer would have made the same decision
had the employer disregarded the discriminatory consideration. 0 The Eighth
Circuit emphasized that Title VII sought to eliminate the consideration of
race from employment decisions."' The Bibbs court stated that the district
court's attempt to quantify a proven discriminatory consideration as a minor
factor in the promotion decision is inappropriate to the Title VII analysis.3 2
The Eighth Circuit held that the district court's finding that discriminatory
racial considerations influenced the promotion decision established liability
under Title VII. 33 The Eighth Circuit, therefore, vacated the judgment for
the defendant and remanded the case to the district court to enter a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff.
34
In Bibbs, the Eighth Circuit stated that in an individual disparate
treatment action the plaintiff must prove that discriminatory considerations
more likely than not motivated the employment decision to establish liability
under Title VII. 31 The Eighth Circuit noted that in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green36 the United States Supreme Court established a prima facie case
concept for individual disparate treatment actions under Title VII. 37 Recog-
nizing that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is often unavailable,
the Supreme Court stated that a disparate treatment plaintiff may establish
a prima facie case of discrimination to raise an inference of discriminatory
intent. 8 The Supreme Court stated that to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination a plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff applied for an available
256 (1981) (discussion of standard of causation in disparate treatment actions under Title VII).
In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the United States Supreme Court stated that
a plaintiff in a disparate treatment action under Title VII must prove intentional discrimination.
450 U.S. at 256. The Burdine court stated that a plaintiff establishes intentional discrimination
by proving that a discriminatory consideration more likely than not influenced the employment
decision. Id.
30. See 749 F.2d at 512; see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text ("same
decision" causation test is inappropriate in Title VII cases).
31. See 749 F.2d at 512; see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
381 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) (Title VII is designed to eliminate certain
discriminatory considerations from employment decisions).
32. 749 F.2d at 512; see supra note 29 and accompanying text (plaintiff must prove
discriminatory consideration more likely than not influenced employment decision to establish
liability under Title VII).
33. See 749 F.2d at 511.
34. Id. at 513.
35. Id. at 511; see supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussion of "more likely than
not" standard of causation for disparate treatment actions under Title VII).
36. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
37. 411 U.S. at 802-04; see Bibbs, 749 F.2d at 510 (discussion of McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case analysis); see also supra note 1 (discussion of prima facie case concept for
disparate treatment actions under Title VII).
38. 411 U.S. at 802-04; see supra note 1 (absent direct evidence of discriminatory intent,
disparate treatment plaintiff may present prima facie case of discrimination).
19851 1445
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position, that the plaintiff possessed the required qualifications, and that the
defendant rejected the plaintiff under circumstances which create an inference
of unlawful discrimination. 9 After the plaintiff establishes an inference of
unlawful discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant.
4 0
To avoid liability, the defendant must articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons for the employment decision. 41 In response, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant's proffered reasons are unworthy of credence or that
discriminatory considerations more likely than not motivated the employment
decision to establish liability under Title VII.
42
Substantial disagreement exists, however, among the federal circuit courts
of appeals concerning the proper allocation of the burden of proof and the
appropriate standard of causation in mixed-motive disparate treatment ac-
tions under Title VII.4 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, for example, has stated that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case method of proving employment discrimination pertains only to situations
in which direct evidence of discriminatory intent is lacking. 44 The Eleventh
Circuit has held that when a disparate treatment plaintiff presents direct
evidence of discrimination a burden of persuasion, rather than production,
shifts to the defendant. 45 The Eleventh Circuit permits a defendant to avoid
liability if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
39. 411 U.S. at 802; see supra note 1 (discussion of elements of prima facie case).
40. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981)
(discussion of burden of proof in disparate treatment actions); see also supra note 3 and
accompanying text (after plaintiff establishes prima facie case, burden of production not
persuasion shifts to employer).
41. See Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981) (discussion of employer's burden of production
in disparate treatment action); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text (employer must
articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for employment decision to rebut plaintiff's
prima facie case of employment discrimination).
42. See 450 U.S. at 256 (discussion of standard of causation in disparate treatment actions
under Title VII); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (disparate treatment plaintiff
must prove that discriminatory consideration more likely than not motivated employment
decision).
43. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussion of various standards of
causation and allocations of burden of proof applied in federal circuit courts of appeals).
44. See Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983) (Mc-
Donnell Douglas prima facie case analysis applies when direct evidence of discriminatory intent
is lacking), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2385 (1984); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875
(I 1th Cir. 1985) (McDonnell Douglas method of proving disparate treatment action pertains to
situations in which direct evidence of discriminatory intent is absent).
45. See Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d at 1557. In Bell v. Birmingham Linen
Service, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that when a disparate
treatment plaintiff presents direct evidence of discriminatory intent a burden of persuasion,
rather than production, shifts to the defendant. Id. In Bell, the plaintiff, who is female, applied
for a position in the washroom of the defendant's laundry. Id. at 1553. Although the plaintiff
had more seniority than the other applicants for the washroom position, the defendant's
production manager did not award the position to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff presented
direct evidence that the defendant's production manager denied the plaintiff the washroom
[Vol. 42:14391446
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defendant would have made the same employment decision absent the proven
discriminatory considerations.
46
Application of the "same decision" standard of causation to determine
liability in a disparate treatment action, however, may distort the purpose
of Title VII. 47 Congress enacted Title VII to prohibit discrimination in
employment based upon an individual's race, color, religion, national origin,
or sex. 48 An employer's consideration of a discriminatory factor in- an
employment decision violates the purpose of Title VII regardless of whether
the employer would have made the "same decision" absent consideration of
an unlawful discriminatory factor. 49 The "same decision" standard of caus-
ation would enable an employer to acknowledge the consideration of unlaw-
ful discriminatory factors, but avoid liability if the employer proves that the
employer would have made the same decision absent consideration of dis-
criminatory factors.50 The "same decision" standard of causation, therefore,
position to prevent other women employed in the laundry from seeking a position in the
washroom. Id. The Eleventh Circuit stated that the defendant can not merely articulate
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision to rebut the plaintiff's direct evidence
of discriminatory intent. Id. at 1557. The Bell court held that to avoid liability under Title VII,
the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have
made the same decision without the presence of the production manager's discriminatory intent.
Id.
46. See Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875-76 (11th Cir. 1985) (defendant may
rebut direct evidence of discriminatory intent if defendant proves that absent presence of
discriminatory motive defendant would have made same decision); Smith v. State of Ga., 749
F.2d 683, 687 (lth Cir. 1985) (applying Mt. Healthy "same decision" test when disparate
treatment plaintiff presents direct evidence of discriminatory intent); Bell v. Birmingham Linen
Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1558 (lth Cir. 1983) (applying Mt. Healthy "same decision" test in
Title VII context when plaintiff presents direct evidence of discriminatory motive); see also
supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussion of Mt. Healthy "same decision" rule of
causation).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). Title VII states that it shall be unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against any individual in employment because of the individual's race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex. Id.; see also Brodin, Standard of Causation, supra note
5, at 317. Professor Brodin emphasized that the "same decision" rule of causation would
frustrate Title VII's objective of eliminating discrimination in employment opportunities because
an employer may avoid liability if the employer proves that he would have made the same
decision absent a proven discriminatory intent. Brodin, Standard of Causation, supra note 5,
at 317. Professor Brodin stated that Title VII is violated when a disparate treatment plaintiff
establishes the operation of an unlawful discriminatory consideration in an employment decision.
Id. at 320. Brodin stated that after a plaintiff establishes the operation of an unlawful
discriminatory consideration, it is irrelevant to the Title VII analysis to consider whether the
employer would have made the same decision absent the presence of the proven discriminatory
intent. Id. at 318.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982); see supra note 47 (Title VII prohibits unlawful
discriminatory considerations in employment).
49. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (same decision rule of causation frustrates
purpose of Title VII).
50. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (same decision rule of causation permits
defendant to rebut direct evidence of discriminatory intent if defendant would have made same
decision without unlawful discriminatory consideration).
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fails to remedy the stigmatization of discrimination and neglects the public
interest in eradicating unlawful discriminatory considerations from employ-
ment decisions.5'
In contrast to the views of the Eleventh Circuit, other federal circuit
courts of appeals have applied the "same decision" standard of causation
in disparate treatment actions to limit some forms of relief, but not to
determine liability. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, for example, has held that after a disparate treatment plaintiff
proves intentional discrimination the employer may prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the employer would have made the same decision
absent discrimination to avoid the imposition of some forms of relief."3 In
Patterson v. Greenwood School District 50,14 the Fourth Circuit held that
Title VII provides that retroactive promotion or hiring and back pay are not
available forms of relief if the employer proves that the employer would
have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination."
In Patterson, the defendant, Greenwood School District 50 (School
District), appealed from a judgment of the United States District Court for
51. See Brodin, Standard of Causation, supra note 5, at 318-19, Professor Brodin stated
that a primary objective of Title VII is to eradicate discriminatory considerations in employment
decisions. Id. at 320. Brodin emphasized that the same decision rule of causation distorts the
purpose of Title VII because an employer who violates Title VII may avoid liability if the
employer proves that without consideration of unlawful discriminatory factors the employer
would have made the same decision. Id. at 318. Professor Brodin noted that the application of
the same decision rule of causation would fail to remedy the stigmatization of discrimination
and would neglect the public interest in prohibiting unlawful discriminatory considerations from
employment decisions. Id. at 318-19.
52. See Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166-67 (9th Cir.
1984). In Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that an employer may avoid an award of back pay if the employer proves
that absent discrimination the employer would not have hired the plaintiff. Id. at 1167; see
King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 257-58 (8th Cir. 1984) (after plaintiff proves
unlawful discrimination, employer may prove that employer would not have hired plaintiff
absent discrimination to limit plaintiff's relief); Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 697
F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1982) (employer may prove that employer would have made same
decision absent discrimination to avoid retroactive promotion and back pay).
53. See Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1982) (after
plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination, employer may prove that employer would have made
same decision absent discrimination to avoid retroactive promotion and back pay).
54. Id.
55. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Section 706(g) of Title VII prohibits the
imposition of retroactive promotion or hiring and back pay if an employer refuses an individual
employment for any reason other than discrimination in violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1982). Congress stated that the remedial focus of section 706(g) is to make the
victims of discrimination whole. See 118 Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972). The Fourth Circuit in
Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, stated that Title VII requires the imposition of
retroactive promotion and back pay only if necessary to make the plaintiff whole. See 696 F.2d
293, 296 (4th Cir. 1982). The Fourth Circuit stated that the defendant would not have selected
the plaintiff for the assistant principle position absent discrimination. Id. The Patterson court,
therefore, affirmed the district court's finding of liability, but reversed the district court's award
of retroactive promotion and back pay because the plaintiff did not suffer any damage. Id.
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the District of South Carolina which held that the defendant had discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff in violation of Title VII and awarded the plaintiff
back pay and promotion.5 6 The plaintiff in Patterson, who is female, applied
for the position of assistant principal at the East End Intermediate School
located in the School District.17 The district court held that the School
District's selection process discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of
the plaintiff's sex in violation of Title VII.55 Although the defendant in
Patterson did not appeal the district court's finding of liability, the defendant
contended that retroactive promotion and back pay were inappropriate forms
of relief because the defendant would have made the same decision absent
discrimination.59 In considering the defendant's appeal, the Fourth Circuit
noted that Title VII prohibits the imposition of retroactive promotion or
hiring and back pay if an employer refuses an individual employment for
any reason other than discrimination in violation of Title VII. 60 The Fourth
Circuit stated that the defendant proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant would not have selected the plaintiff absent discrimination
and, therefore, reversed the district court's award of retroactive promotion
and back pay. 61 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits also have applied the "same decision" standard of causation
at the relief stage of disparate treatment actions to enable an employer to
avoid retroactive promotion or hiring and back pay.
62
In the liability stage of a disparate treatment action, the federal circuit
courts of appeals have applied various formulations of the appropriate
standard of causation to establish a Title VII violation. 63 For example, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits have applied
a "but for" standard of causation to establish liability under Title VII. 64 In
56. See 696 F.2d at 294.
57. Id. In Patterson, the plaintiff and three other individuals applied for the position of
assistant principal. Id. Five male superintendents of the Greenwood School District 50 (School
District) interviewed the applicants and recommended the only male applicant for the assistant
principal position. Id.
58. Id. The district court in Patterson stated that the School District's selection process
discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of the plaintiff's sex. Id. The district court stated
that the superintendents searched for a candidate according to a male stereotype and deviated
from standard selection procedures. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 295; see supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussion of section 706(g) of
Title VII).
61. Patterson, 696 F.2d at 295; see supra note 55 and accompanying text (award of
retroactive promotion and back pay is appropriate only if necessary to make victim of unlawful
discrimination whole).
62. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (employer may prove that employer would
have made same decision absent discrimination to avoid award of retroactive promotion and
back pay).
63. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussion of various formulations of
appropriate standard of causation in disparate treatment actions under Title VII).
64. See McMillan v. Rust College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983). In McMillan
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Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh,6 5 the Third Circuit held that to establish
liability under Title VII a disparate treatment plaintiff must prove that but
for the defendant's consideration of discriminatory factors the defendant
would have hired or promoted the plaintiff. 66 The "but for" standard of
causation requires a plaintiff to prove not only that an unlawful discrimi-
natory consideration influenced the employment decision, but that the
defendant would have hired the plaintiff absent discrimination. 67 The Eighth
Circuit in Bibbs emphasized that the "but for" standard of causation
unreasonably requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to disprove the defend-
ant's allegations of the defendant's subjective intent. 6s The "but for" stand-
ard of causation, therefore, may frustrate Title VII's objective of eliminating
unlawful discriminatory considerations in employment because liability will
attach only if an employer's consideration of an unlawful discriminatory
factor is the determinative factor in a challenged employment decision. 69
In contrast to the "but for" standard of causation, several other federal
circuit courts of appeals have stated that to establish liability under Title VII
v. Rust College, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that to
establish liability under Title VII a disparate treatment plaintiff must prove that an employment
decision adverse to the plaintiff would not have occurred but for the defendant's unlawful
discrimination. Id.; see also Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 1983)
(plaintiff must prove that but for consideration of discriminatory factor employment decision
would have been favorable to plaintiff to establish liability under Title VII).
65. 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983).
66. Id. at 914. The Third Circuit in Lewis stated that Title VII requires a showing of
"but for" causation to establish liability in a disparate treatment action. Id. The Lewis court
stated that to establish liability under Title VII a disparate treatment plaintiff must prove that
but for the defendant's consideration of unlawful discriminatory factors the defendant would
have hired the plaintiff. Id. at 917; see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427
U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (Title VII plaintiff must prove that but for defendant's consideration
of plaintiff's race defendant would have hired plaintiff).
67. See supra notes 64 & 66 and accompanying text (discussion of "but for" standard of
causation).
68. See Bibbs, 749 F.2d at 512-13. The Eighth Circuit in Bibbs noted that the "but for"
standard of causation requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to prove not only that an unlawful
discriminatory consideration motivated the employment decision, but to assume the additional
burden of proving that the defendant would have hired the plaintiff absent discrimination. Id.
at 512. The Bibbs court stated that the additional burden of proving that the defendant would
have hired the plaintiff absent discrimination is irrelevant to the Title VII analysis after the
plaintiff has established that an unlawful discriminatory consideration motivated the challenged
employment decision. Id. The Eighth Circuit also emphasized that the additional burden of
proving that the defendant would have hired the plaintiff absent the discrimination unreasonably
requires the plaintiff to disprove the defendant's allegations of the defendant's subjective
motivation. Id. at 513.
69. See Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 922 (3d Cir. 1983) (Adams, J.,
dissenting). In Lewis, the dissent argued that the "but for" standard of causation would permit
the operation of an unlawful discriminatory consideration in an employment decision if
legitimate nondiscriminatory considerations determined the decision. Id. The dissent, therefore,
emphasized that the "but for" standard of causation would neglect the victims of discriminatory
treatment in employment and distort the objectives of Title VII. Id.
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a disparate treatment plaintiff must prove only that an unlawful discrimi-
natory consideration more likely than not motivated the challenged employ-
ment decision. 70 The "more likely than not" standard of causation is
consistent with Title VII's primary objective of eliminating discrimination in
employment. 7 The legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress
sought to prohibit distinctions or differences in the treatment of employees
because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.72 Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine stated that in the final stage of the prima facie case analysis a
disparate treatment plaintiff must prove that discriminatory considerations
more likely than not motivated the employment decision to establish liability
under Title VII. 7" The McDonnell Douglas prima facie case analysis presumes
that otherwise unexplained actions disadvantaging minorities are more likely
than not the product of unlawful discriminatory considerations in violation
of Title VII. 74 If a disparate treatment plaintiff must prove that but for the
defendant's consideration of an unlawful discriminatory factor the defendant
would have hired the plaintiff, the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
analysis becomes an empty ritual.
The Eighth Circuit in Bibbs held that to establish liability under Title
VII a disparate treatment plaintiff must prove that an unlawful discrimina-
tory consideration more likely than not motivated the challenged employment
decision. 7 The Eighth Circuit's holding supports Title VII's primary objective
70. See Jackson v. RKO Bottlers of Toledo, Inc., 743 F.2d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 1984). In
Jackson v. RKO Bottlers of Toledo, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that to establish liability under Title VII a disparate treatment plaintiff must prove
that an unlawful discriminatory consideration motivated the challenged employment decision.
Id.; see Sweeny v. Research Foundation of the State Univ. of New York, 711 F.2d 1179, 1186-
87 (2d Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must prove that discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated
defendant to establish Title VII liability); Cuthbertson v. Biggers Bros., Inc., 702 F.2d 454, 458
(4th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must prove that unlawful discriminatory consideration more likely
than not motivated employment decision to establish liability under Title VII).
71. See 110 Cong. Rec. 7218 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark on Title VII). Senator
Clark stated that Title VII prohibits distinctions and differences in the treatment of employees
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. Id.; see also 110 Cong. Rec. 13,088
(1964). Senator Hubert Humphrey emphasized that Title VII prohibits the use of race, color,
religion, national origin, or sex as a factor in denying employment. 110 Cong. Rec. 13,088
(1964). The "more likely than not" standard of causation supports Title VII's primary objective
of eliminating unlawful discriminatory considerations in employment because a disparate
treatment plaintiff establishes a violation of Title VII when the plaintiff proves the operation
of an unlawful motivating factor in the challenged employment decision. See Brodin, Standard
of Causation, supra note 5, at 320.
72. See supra note 71 (Title VII sought to eliminate unlawful discriminatory considerations
in employment decisions).
73. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (plaintiff in disparate treatment action under
Title VII establishes intentional discrimination by proving that discriminatory consideration
more likely than not motivated employment decision).
74. See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (discussion of McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case analysis for disparate treatment actions under Title VII).
75. See supra notes 29 & 35 and accompanying text (disparate treatment plaintiff must
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of eliminating unlawful discriminatory considerations in employment and
assuring that legitimate nondiscriminatory considerations determine employ-
ment decisions. 76 The "more likely than not" standard of causation estab-
lishes a violation of Title VII when a disparate treatment plaintiff proves the
operation of an unlawful motivating factor in the challenged employment
decision. 77 The more stringent "but for" standard of causation would require
a disparate treatment plaintiff to prove not only the operation of an unlawful
motivating factor in the challenged employment decision, but to assume the
additional burden of proving that the defendant would have hired the
plaintiff absent discrimination. 78 Title VII, however, is violated when a
disparate treatment plaintiff proves the operation of an unlawful motivating
factor in a challenged employment decision. 79 The "but for" standard of
causation's additional burden of proving that the defendant would have
hired the plaintiff absent discrimination fails to support Title VII's primary
objective and may discourage the filing of legitimate Title VII actions in the
future.
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prove that discriminatory consideration more likely than not motivated challenged employment
decision).
76. See supra note 71 and accompanying text ("more likely than not" standard of
causation supports primary objective of Title VII).
77. See supra notes 29, 35 & 71 and accompanying text (discussion of "more likely than
not" standard of causation).
78. See supra notes 64 & 66 and accompanying text (discussion of "but for" standard of
causation).
79. See supra note 68 and accompanying text ("but for" standard of causation imposes
additional burden which is inconsistent with Title VII analysis).
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